Following the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 the President declared a na

Following the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 the President declared a na www.phwiki.com

Following the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 the President declared a na

Silverstein, Rob, Executive Producer has reference to this Academic Journal, PHwiki organized this Journal Following the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 the President declared a national emergency Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld cautioned on the importance of maintaining OPSEC as DOD Forces take part in the world-wide ef as long as t to defeat international terrorism WHAT IS OPSEC – OPSEC is a critical component of U.S. Military activities – a process where one keeps routine indicators of one’s capabilities, actions, in addition to plans masked in addition to away from prying eyes – Maintaining the operations security of plans in addition to gaining the fullest possible surprise are essential to maintaining freedom of action

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THE ORIGIN OF OPSEC – There is nothing new about the principles underlying OPSEC. In fact, we can trace OPSEC practices back to the colonial days in addition to the Revolutionary War. George Washington, our first president, was a known OPSEC practitioner. General Washington was quoted as saying, “Even minutiae should have a place in our collection, as long as things of a seemingly trifling nature, when enjoined with others of a more serious cast, may lead to valuable conclusion.” THE ORIGIN OF OPSEC (con’t) OPSEC, as a methodology, originated during the Vietnam conflict when a small group of individuals were assigned the mission of finding out how the enemy was obtaining advance in as long as mation on certain combat operations in Southeast Asia. This team was established by the Comm in addition to er -in-Chief, Pacific, in addition to given the code name “PURPLE DRAGON.” THE ORIGIN OF OPSEC (con’t) It became apparent to the team that although traditional security in addition to intelligence countermeasures programs existed, reliance solely upon them was insufficient to deny critical in as long as mation to the enemy-especially in as long as mation in addition to indicators relating to intentions in addition to capabilities. The group conceived in addition to developed the methodology of analyzing U.S. operations from an adversarial viewpoint to find out how the in as long as mation was obtained. The team then recommended corrective actions to local comm in addition to ers. They were successful in what they did, in addition to to name what they had done, they coined the term “operations security.”

THE INTELLIGENCE PUZZLE – Intelligence collection in addition to analysis is very much like assembling a picture puzzle. – Intelligence collectors are fully aware of the importance of obtaining small bits of in as long as mation (or “pieces” of a puzzle) from many sources in addition to assembling them to as long as m the overall picture. – Intelligence collectors use numerous methods in addition to sources to develop pieces of the intelligence puzzle . Their collection methods range from sophisticated surveillance using highly technical electronic methods to simple visual observation of activities (these activities are referred to as “indicators”). THE INTELLIGENCE PUZZLE (cont’d) In as long as mation may be collected by: – monitoring radio in addition to telephone or email conversations – analyzing telephone directories, financial or purchasing documents, position or “job” announcements -travel documents, blueprints or drawings, distribution lists, shipping in addition to receiving documents, even personal in as long as mation or items found in the unclassified trash. PREMISE OF OPSEC The premise of OPSEC is that the accumulation of one or more elements of sensitive/unclassified in as long as mation or data could damage national security by revealing classified in as long as mation GOAL OF OPSEC The goal of OPSEC, as a “countermeasures” program, is to deny potential adversaries in as long as mation about capabilities in addition to /or intentions by identifying, controlling in addition to protecting generally unclassified evidence of the planning in addition to execution of sensitive activities

OPSEC: A 5 STEP PROCESS 1. IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL INFORMATION TO BE PROTECTED. 2. THREAT ANALYSIS 3. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 4. RISK ASSESSMENT 5. APPLICATION OF COUNTERMEASURES 1. IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL INFORMATION Basic to the OPSEC process is determining what in as long as mation, if available to one or more adversaries, would harm an organization’s ability to effectively carry out the operation or activity. This critical in as long as mation constitutes the “core secrets” of the organization, i.e., the few nuggets of in as long as mation that are central to the organization’s mission or the specific activity. Critical in as long as mation usually is, or should be, classified or least protected as sensitive unclassified in as long as mation. 2. ANALYSIS OF THREATS Knowing who the adversaries are in addition to what in as long as mation they require to meet their objectives is essential in determining what in as long as mation is truly critical to an organization’s mission effectiveness. In any given situation, there is likely to be more than one adversary in addition to each may be interested in different types of in as long as mation. The adversary’s ability to collect, process, analyze, in addition to use in as long as mation, i.e., the threat, must also be determined.

3. ANALYSIS OF VULNERABILITIES Determining vulnerabilities involves analysis of how our operations in addition to or activities are conducted. Activities must be viewed as the adversaries will view it, thereby providing the basis as long as underst in addition to ing how a unit or organization really operates in addition to what are the true, rather than the hypothetical, vulnerabilities. 4. ASSESSMENT OF RISKS Vulnerabilities in addition to specific threats must be matched. Where the vulnerabilities are great in addition to the adversary threat is evident, the risk of adversary exploitation is expected. There as long as e, a high priority as long as protection needs to be assigned in addition to corrective action taken. Where the vulnerability is slight in addition to the adversary has a marginal collection capability, the priority should be low. 5. APPLICATION OF COUNTERMEASURES Countermeasures are developed to eliminate the vulnerabilities, threats, or utility of the in as long as mation to the adversaries The possible countermeasures should include alternatives that may vary in effectiveness in addition to feasibility Countermeasures may include anything that is likely to work in a particular situation

OPSEC: A 5 STEP PROCESS 1. IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL INFORMATION TO BE PROTECTED. 2. THREAT ANALYSIS 3. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 4. RISK ASSESSMENT 5. APPLICATION OF COUNTERMEASURES The 3 Laws of OPSEC 1. If you don’t know the threat, how do you know what to protect 2. If you don’t know what to protect, how do you know you are protecting it 3. If you are not protecting it .the adversary wins! The First Law of OPSEC If you don’t know the threat, how do you know what to protect If there were no threats to Military programs, activities, facilities, personnel, or in as long as mation, there would be no need as long as gates, access control procedures, access clearances, in addition to classification. However, DOD/DON recognizes that threats do exist-although specific threats may vary from site to site or program to program. Military personnel must be aware of the actual in addition to postulated threats to our comm in addition to in addition to mission. In any given situation, there is likely to be more than one adversary, although each may be interested in different in as long as mation.

The Second Law of OPSEC If you don’t know what to protect, how do you know you are protecting it The “what” is the critical in addition to sensitive, or target, in as long as mation that adversaries require to meet their objectives. The Third Law of OPSEC If you are not protecting it (the critical in addition to sensitive in as long as mation), the adversary wins! OPSEC vulnerability assessments, can be conducted to determine whether or not critical in as long as mation is vulnerable to exploitation. These assessments as long as m a critical analysis of “what we do” in addition to “how we do it” from the perspective of an adversary. Internal procedures in addition to in as long as mation sources are also used to determine whether there is an inadvertent release of sensitive in as long as mation. OPSEC – AN ALL HANDS EVOLUTION Each of us must take a look at our own behavior, here are a few suggestions – exercise caution when discussing work – pay close attention to where you are in addition to who may be listening – take care when talking on the phone or using computer systems – the “door of potential compromise” is opened every time an non-secure phone line is in use inside a secure area – only discuss classified in as long as mation in authorized spaces with those having both the proper security clearance in addition to “need to know”

REMEMBER ! – Even a seemingly benign piece of in as long as mation, whether it be verbal or written, can be used by potential adversaries to target our people. – The one piece of harmless in as long as mation you unwittingly give away could be the piece that “completes the puzzle”. 10 RULES OF OPSEC DON’T: 1. discuss future destinations! 2. discuss future operations or missions ! 3. discuss dates in addition to times of conducting an exercises ! 4. discuss readiness issues or numbers ! 5. discuss specific training equipment ! 6. discuss people’s names in addition to billets in conjunction with operations ! 7. speculate about future operations ! 8. spread rumors about operations ! 9. assume the enemy is not trying to collect in as long as mation on you so he can kill you, he is ! DO: 10. be smart, in addition to always think OPSEC when using email, or phone, or any other medium of INTEL transfer! OPSEC IN SUMMARY A process designed to disrupt or defeat the ability of as long as eign intelligence or other adversaries to exploit sensitive military activities or in as long as mation in addition to to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of such in as long as mation.

Silverstein, Rob Billy Bush Show Executive Producer www.phwiki.com

REFERENCES AND SOURCES – AR 530-1 – http://www.nv.doe.gov/ – http://www.weaponeeronline.com/ – http://www.13meu.usmc.mil/ – http://www.peleliu.navy.mil/ – http://www.smdc.army.mil/ ANY QUESTIONS

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