Introduction to Inherently Safer Design Prepared as long as Safety in addition to Chemical Engin

Introduction to Inherently Safer Design Prepared as long as Safety in addition to Chemical Engin www.phwiki.com

Introduction to Inherently Safer Design Prepared as long as Safety in addition to Chemical Engin

Putnam, Gretchen, Field Producer has reference to this Academic Journal, PHwiki organized this Journal Introduction to Inherently Safer Design Prepared as long as Safety in addition to Chemical Engineering Education (SACHE) by: Dennis C. Hendershot Rohm in addition to Haas Company, retired ©American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 2006 What is inherently safer design Inherent – “existing in something as a permanent in addition to inseparable element ” Eliminate or minimize hazards rather than control hazards Safety based on physical in addition to chemical properties of the system, not “add-on” safety devices in addition to systems “Safer” – not “Safe” Why Inherently Safer Design

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A subset of Green Engineering Green Chemistry in addition to Engineering Inherently Safer Design History of inherently safer design Not really a new concept – elimination of hazards has a long history Second half of 20th Century chemical industry – increased hazards from huge, world scale petrochemical plants Concern about cost in addition to reliability of traditional “add on” safety systems Trevor Kletz – ICI (1977) – Is there a better way Eliminate or dramatically reduce hazards Hazard An inherent physical or chemical characteristic that has the potential as long as causing harm to people, the environment, or property (CCPS, 1992). Hazards are intrinsic to a material, or its conditions of use. Examples Phosgene – toxic by inhalation Acetone – flammable High pressure steam – potential energy due to pressure, high temperature

To eliminate hazards: Eliminate the material Change the material Change the conditions of use Chemical Process Safety Strategies Inherent Passive Active Procedural Inherent Eliminate or reduce the hazard by changing the process or materials which are non-hazardous or less hazardous Integral to the product, process, or plant – cannot be easily defeated or changed without fundamentally altering the process or plant design EXAMPLE Substituting water as long as a flammable solvent (latex paints compared to oil base paints)

Passive Minimize hazard using process or equipment design features which reduce frequency or consequence without the active functioning of any device EXAMPLE Containment dike around a hazardous material storage tank Active Controls, safety interlocks, automatic shut down systems Multiple active elements Sensor – detect hazardous condition Logic device – decide what to do Control element – implement action Prevent incidents, or mitigate the consequences of incidents EXAMPLES High level alarm in a tank shuts automatic feed valve A sprinkler system which extinguishes a fire Procedural St in addition to ard operating procedures, safety rules in addition to st in addition to ard procedures, emergency response procedures, training EXAMPLE Confined space entry procedures

Human Reliability Available Response Time (minutes) 1 10 20 30 60 Probability of incorrect diagnosis – single control room event ~1.0 0.5 0.1 0.01 0.001 Source: Swain, A.D., H in addition to book of Human Reliability Analysis, August 1983, NUREG/CR-1278-F, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Batch Chemical Reactor Example Hazard of concern – runaway reaction causing high temperature in addition to pressure in addition to potential reactor rupture Example – Morton International, Paterson, NJ runaway reaction in 1998, injured 9 people Inherent Develop chemistry which is not exothermic, or mildly exothermic Maximum adiabatic reactor temperature < boiling point of all ingredients in addition to onset temperature of any decomposition or other reactions, in addition to no gaseous products are generated by the reaction The reaction does not generate any pressure, either from confined gas products or from boiling of the reactor contents Inherent Passive Maximum adiabatic pressure as long as reaction determined to be 150 psig From vapor pressure of reactor contents or generation of gaseous products Run reaction in a 250 psig design reactor Hazard (pressure) still exists, but passively contained by the pressure vessel Passive Active Maximum adiabatic pressure as long as 100% reaction is 150 psig, reactor design pressure is 50 psig Gradually add limiting reactant with temperature control to limit potential energy from reaction Use high temperature in addition to pressure interlocks to stop feed in addition to apply emergency cooling Provide emergency relief system Active Procedural Maximum adiabatic pressure as long as 100% reaction is 150 psig, reactor design pressure is 50 psig Gradually add limiting reactant with temperature control to limit potential energy from reaction Train operator to observe temperature, stop feeds in addition to apply cooling if temperature exceeds critical operating limit Procedural Which strategy should we use Generally, in order of robustness in addition to reliability: Inherent Passive Active Procedural But - there is a place in addition to need as long as ALL of these strategies in a complete safety program Layers of Protection Putnam, Gretchen E! Entertainment Television Field Producer www.phwiki.com

Multiple Layers of Protection Degraded Layers of Protection “Inherently Safe” Process No additional layers of protection needed Probably not possible if you consider ALL potential hazards But, we can be “Inherently Safer”

Inherently Safer Process Risk Managing multiple hazards – Process Option No. 1 Toxicity Explosion Fire Toxicity Explosion Fire Managing multiple hazards – Process Option No. 2

Resources Guidelines as long as Engineering Design as long as Process Safety, Chapter 2 “Inherently Safer Plants.” American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, 1993. Guidelines as long as Design Solutions as long as Process Equipment Failures, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, 1998. Resources INSIDE Project in addition to INSET Toolkit, Commission of the European Community, 1997 – available as long as download from: http://www.aeat-safety- in addition to -risk.com/html/inset.html Extensive journal in addition to conference proceedings literature

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