Knowledge in addition to Preventive Action Early Warning in addition to Preventive Policy – The Puzzle Blaming the Message: Causes of Inaccurate & Late Warning Blaming the Politicians: Lack of Political Will to Prevent Critique of George & Holl (1997)

Knowledge in addition to Preventive Action Early Warning in addition to Preventive Policy – The Puzzle Blaming the Message: Causes of Inaccurate & Late Warning Blaming the Politicians: Lack of Political Will to Prevent Critique of George & Holl (1997)

Knowledge in addition to Preventive Action Early Warning in addition to Preventive Policy – The Puzzle Blaming the Message: Causes of Inaccurate & Late Warning Blaming the Politicians: Lack of Political Will to Prevent Critique of George & Holl (1997)

Duffy, Michael, Contributing Editor has reference to this Academic Journal, PHwiki organized this Journal Communicating Across the Warning-Response-Gap: How Persuasion about Preventive Policy Works Paper presented at the US Institute as long as Peace, 19/2/2009, Washington Christoph O Meyer King’s College London, Department of War Studies FORESIGHT Knowledge in addition to Preventive Action It is difficult to get money as long as medicine but easy to get it as long as the coffin (Chinese proverb) Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge Where is the knowledge we have lost in in as long as mation (T.S. Eliot) Early Warning in addition to Preventive Policy – The Puzzle Underlying Assumptions: accurate in addition to timely warning is possible preventive action is always better than crisis & consequence management But: ‘Missed Opportunities’ in addition to Warning-Response Gap: Rw in addition to a, Bosnia, Darfur What is causing the gap Failure of warning, failure of political will or something in-between

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Blaming the Message: Causes of Inaccurate & Late Warning – Epistemological problems Lack of Indicators (unknown knowns) Uncertainty (known unknowns), eg secrecy/deception Unpredictability (unknown unknowns) Lack of Reliable Theory – Indicator–Action Problem: Optimal point as long as warning is not just defined by indicators, but also by ‚lead time‘ as long as policy options – late rather than early warnings – Disincentives to rigorous academic as long as ecasting in the social sciences – Bias towards science of discovery (rather than integration in addition to application), reputational costs in addition to political instrumentalisation Blaming the Politicians: Lack of Political Will to Prevent Asymmetric incentives to preventive policy: known costs of action, but unknown consequences of inaction Too high receptivity causes resource depletion in addition to ultimately paralysis How to define in addition to justify acceptable residual risks Short-term prevention vis-a-vis resolution of underlying causes through crisis (‚let small rather than big bubbles burst‘) What about the In-Between The Warning Response Gap (George & Holl, 1997) the low stakes of international policy-makers regarding many risks the uncertainty in addition to ambiguity of predicting when a crisis will escalate the lack of good theories in addition to indicators to as long as ecast accurately the impact of over-prediction (cry wolf-syndrome) In as long as mational overload of organisations/deciders political incentives as long as decision-maker to wait until violence has escalated (corpses on the ground)

Critique of George & Holl (1997) Theoretical micro-foundations in addition to assumptions remain unclear – functionalist learning model No systematic empirical test across cases, risk of hindsight bias by focusing only on failure Leaves out potentially important explanations from other literatures One-way, rather than discoursive underst in addition to ing of warning-response process: relationship between warners-deciders, feed-back in addition to direction Need to differentiate between cognitive in addition to policy impact of warnings Source Factors – Trustworthiness – Independence – Expertise – Status Situational & Context Factors Strategic culture – Current & previous ‘similar’ case – Policy fluid or fixed – Agenda competition – Proximity of Elections Message Factors – Type & level of risk – Evidential ambiguity – Argument/Appeal – Usability/timeliness of recommendations Audience Factors Individuals – Causal & political beliefs – Costs of action/inaction – Cognitive styles & biases – Expertise & self-esteem Governmental Organisations – Reputational implications – Resource implications – Organisational culture – Coordination structures Media organisations – News values, esp. relevance & proximity – Editorial culture & professional routines – Political affiliation & proprietor bias Cognitive Processing Allocating Attention Comprehension of risk causes, intensity & consequences Rationalising Acceptance vs Rejection Steps Towards Prevention Changed perception of risk Prioritisation of risk prevention & mitigation Behavioural change towards prevention Feedback & Reaction Positive vs negative feed-back Extended or restricted scope in addition to depth of risk analysis Addition or withdrawal of resources as long as risk analysis Figure 1: Model of the Warning–Response Discourse W A R N I N G I N D I C A T O R S Discourse Factors – De-/ Politicisation – Frame compatibility – Voice asymmetries – Mode of discourse Early Warning in addition to Political Response: Key Hypotheses (1) A response to warning is more likely when: 1) Warnings originate from a trustworthy source from the perspective of decision-makers. Trustworthiness is mostly a function of being seen as unbiased or more likely compatibly biased in addition to rein as long as ced by high status, indicators of expertise in addition to good past track-record in as long as ecasting. 2) Warnings are unambiguous, salient in addition to consistent across different types of sources (governmental in addition to private) in addition to when they include recommendations as long as feasible/low risk preventive/mitigating options compared to the risks of inaction.

Early Warning in addition to Political Response: Key Hypotheses (2) 3) Warnings are communicated in situations when policy is not deeply ingrained financially or politically, when they are supported by lessons learnt from ‘similar cases’ available in recent history in addition to when there is little distracting ‘noise’ in addition to agenda competition. 4) Producers in addition to consumers of warning engage with each other at an early stage in non-politicised discourse, using similar frames of reference, offering each other near-equal voice opportunities in addition to interacting face-to-face. 5) Warnings resonate positively with the beliefs in addition to interests of the audience. Most importantly from the perspective of individuals is the ideational fit, from the perspective of organisations the established policy-fit, in addition to from the perspective of the media, the audience/commercial-fit. Comparative in addition to Longitudinal Research Design Comparision across cases, actors in addition to time Selection of 12 cases based on 1) High variation on dependent variable (responding to warnings, from success to failure) 2) Moderate/high degree of European interests in country in addition to /or involvement in preventive action 3) Spread of cases between 1990-2008 4) Three cases each from recent Enlargement round, Balkans, post-Soviet Space, in addition to African Great Lakes region Warning-Response Discourse studied through process tracing enriched by quantitative/quantitative discourse analysis Potential Recommendations For Producers of Warnings – how to establish trustworthiness in terms of expertise/track record in the eyes of different audiences – how to present ambiguity/risk/options as long as policy (role-taking) as long as different audiences For NGO / Advocates – when to go public, rather than approach decision-makers directly – how to overcome news media thresholds in order to influence For Organisations – procedures as long as fast-tracking in addition to processing urgent warnings – organisational culture that encourages uncom as long as table truths For Decision-makers – higher awareness of impact of own beliefs in addition to cognitive biases – higher awareness of lower risk opportunities as long as preventive action

Key Questions Identifying in addition to measuring relatively successful cases in terms of awareness in addition to acceptance How good is “early warning” in terms of accuracy in timeliness Can we assume quality risk as long as ecasts How do scientists, think-tankers in addition to NGOs cooperate Is there a collaborative or competitive warning community What is the scope as long as influencing humanitarian in addition to conventional state in addition to organisational interests Has receptivity to warning increased since 1989 due to normative in addition to technological changes in addition to if so what impact does this have on preventive policy Impact of financial crisis in addition to security concerns on warning-response discourse Thank you as long as your attention! More about Foresight at: as long as esight Questions

Duffy, Michael Newport Beach [714] Contributing Editor

Duffy, Michael Contributing Editor

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